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Introduction
Mental imagery is a set of  representations that gives rise to the experience of  viewing 
a stimulus in the absence of  appropriate sensory input: information in memory underlies 
the internal events that produce the experience (Kosslyn, 2005). It is generally understood 
that individuals show marked differences in mental imagery. Some distinct imagery abilities, 
such as vividness (how vividly individuals create images), controllability (the ability to form 
and modify visual images), and cognitive style (whether individuals adopt visual [visualizer] 
or verbal [verbalizer] strategies in cognitive processing, such as when the participants were 
presented learning materials [pictures and texts, which were self-contained], visualizer and 
verbalizer mainly focused on picture and text information, respectively, which were shown 
by an eye-tracking study: Koć-Januchta, Höffler, Thoma, Prechtl, & Leutner, 2017) have 
been reported. In order to measure these imagery abilities, some questionnaires have been 
used, such as the Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI: Betts, 1909), the Test of  Visual 
Imagery Control (TVIC: Gordon, 1949; Richardson, 1969), the Vividness of  Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (Marks, 1973), the Auditory Imagery Questionnaire (AIQ: Hishitani, 2009), and 
the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ: Richardson, 1977).
    Although it is commonly understood that individual differences in imagery abilities are 
large, some previous studies have reported “blind imagination” (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 
2015, 2016; Zeman et al., 2020). From a clinical point of  view, these cases of  blind imagination 
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have already been discussed in previous studies (e.g., Farah, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988; Grüter, 
Grüter, Bell, & Carbon, 2009; Ji, Kavanagh, Holmes, MacLeod, & Di Simplicio, 2019). For 
example, individuals with prosopagnosia show difficulties in creating imagery, and this 
condition is supported by clinical factors. However, the case of  blind imagination (with normal 
vision) was proposed by Zeman et al. (2015, 2016, 2020) despite no assumption of  clinical 
factors. This condition is defined as “aphantasia,” or the lack of  a “mind’s eye” (Zeman et al., 
2015). 
Psychological findings on aphantasia have begun to be collected in recent studies (Jacobs, 
Schwarzkopf, & Silvanto, 2018; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Zeman et al., 2015). Zeman et al. (2015) 
reported visual imagery ability using the VVIQ (Marks, 1973) in individuals with aphantasia 
who showed a substantial or complete deficit in voluntary visual imagery. Moreover, individuals 
with aphantasia showed no or weak visual imagery using the binocular rivalry (Keogh & 
Pearson, 2018), visual short-term memory (Jacobs et al., 2018), drawings of  real-world scenes 
(Bainbridge, Pounder, Eardley, & Baker, 2021), and measuring the skin conductance level for 
emotional stimuli (Wicken, Keogh, & Pearson, 2019). For binocular rivalry, Keogh and Pearson 
(2018) used green-vertical or red-horizontal Gabor patches as experimental stimuli. In the 
sequence, the participants were first asked to imagine one of  two Gabor patches. Thereafter, 
they were shown binocular rivalry by presenting the two Gabor patches with each left or right 
eye. Following this, they were asked to respond which image they saw most (green-vertical, 
perfectly mixed, and red horizontal). If  the participants could create a vividly imagery of  the 
Gabor patch in advance, they tend to respond to the same Gabor patch with imagery because 
it acts as the priming stimuli in the binocular rivalry. People with aphantasia showed a lower 
priming effect compared with general (non-aphantasic) people. This study showed objective 
evidence of  imagery deficits in people with aphantasia. Moreover, in the visual short-term 
memory task (Jacobs et al., 2018), there were visual working memory and imagery versions. 
In the working memory version, the name of  one of  three geometric shapes (“diamond”, 
“parallelogram”, and “triangle”) were first presented on a screen. After this, the corresponding 
shape was presented visually on the screen, within four placeholders (with four corners). After 
a mask and blank screens, the participants were required to judge whether the target stimulus 
appeared within the boundaries of  the geometric shape. In the imagery version, the task was 
identical to the working memory version, apart from the stimulus presentation stage. The 
corresponding shape was not visually presented on screen (only four placeholders with four 
corners were presented, which marked the visual area where the geometric shape had to be 
imagined). After the mask and blank screens were presented, the participants were required to 
judge whether the target stimulus appeared within the boundaries of  the imagined geometric 
shape, exactly like in the working memory version. If  the participants created vividness 
imagery of  the geometric shape, they could complete the task. The person with aphantasia 
showed lower performance compared with the control group, indicating that the person with 
aphantasia could not create sufficient imagery of  geometric shape. According to these previous 
studies, psychological findings have begun to be examined. However, it is necessary to collect 
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physiological evidence since there are almost no findings (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 
2019).
In daily life, people with aphantasia tend to experience some difficulties (Kendle, 2017). 
Kendle (2017) collected and compiled many episodes from people with aphantasia. Many 
people generally claimed that they are more likely to experience that they have no sense 
of  direction (e.g., they cannot see the map as visual imagery), that they cannot share an 
important life events such as weddings (e.g., they cannot see their wife who wore wedding dress 
in their memory), and that they cannot feel their emotions from memory (e.g., they cannot 
feel happiness or sadness from memory because of  their imagery deficit).
It is important to understand aphantasia to reduce their difficulties in daily life. However, 
to the best of  our knowledge, there have been almost no studies in Japan examining individuals 
with aphantasia. A few years ago, we met a person who claimed to have no visual imagery. 
Based on recent findings (Zeman et al., 2015, 2016, 2020) and the psychological characteristics 
of  the same person, we suspected that he might be a singular case of  aphantasia in Japan. By 
reporting his case as a preliminary study in Japan, we expect to promote the development of  




KI (not his actual initials) was a right-handed male living in Japan and 49 years of  
age at the time we interviewed him for this study. KI was engaged in a service trade, and 
his work performance was good. He realized his blind imagination in his twenties when he 
talked to his friends; KI wondered why his friend talked about his car having a scratch even 
though the car was not present. His friend talked about the image of  his car, but KI could not 
understand that situation because of  his blind imagination. Moreover, he felt stressed at work 
when customers asked him where an item was displayed. KI spent about ten years without 
a problem at that time; although he had submitted a report about his blind imagination to 
the personnel department of  the company, the personnel director did not address this report. 
When KI was in his thirties, his department was changed to a busy post that induced a 
diagnosis of  depression. His department was later re-changed to another post in which he 
could work using only verbal processing, and he spent about ten years without a problem and 
with good work performance. When KI was in his forties, his post was again changed to a busy 
post. Since his boss could not understand his blind imagination, KI had to work using a design 
(using visual images). Based on this trouble, KI had great stress and asked his supervisor 
and the personnel director to change his post. KI has continued working while appealing for 
accommodation for his blind imagination.
KI had no difficulty watching animation contents or a flip book, and his memory and 
reading/writing were intact. KI could differentiate between faces (his wife and sons), but he 
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had difficulties in imagining these faces from memory. Moreover, although KI remembered the 
contents of  TV programs that he had watched the evening before, he could not recollect scenes 
from them as visual images. He sufficiently expressed their contents using sentences and 
words, but he could not express the visual contents concretely, such as color, shape, or design. 
KI was conscious of  his compensatory strength in verbal processing: He showed advantages in 
reading/writing abilities at work, and so he was easily able to work successfully when asked to 
do work that involved reading and writing.
Measures
We used Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices (RCPM: Raven, Court, & Raven, 1995) 
to measure KI’s visual ability. Moreover, to examine KI’s imagery abilities, we adopted the 
QMI (Betts, 1909), which measures the vividness of  imagery in seven sensory modalities 
(visual, auditory, tactile, pain, gustatory, olfactory, and somatic images), VVIQ (Marks, 1973) 
measuring the vividness of  visual imagery, TVIC (Gordon, 1949; Richardson, 1969) measuring 
controllability, VVQ (Richardson, 1977) measuring cognitive style, and AIQ (Hishitani, 2009), 
which can assess vividness of  auditory imagery.
Procedures




We analyzed the RCPM, and KI obtained a score of  34/36, indicating that there was no 
problem in his visual ability.
Imagery abilities
The QMI shows higher rating points for a weaker vividness of  imagery. KI rated five 
questions in each sensory modality using a 7-point Likert scale (from 1: no image at all, 
you only “know” that you are thinking of  the object to 7: perfectly clear and as lively as seeing 
it for real). He showed 10/35 points for auditory images although he gave the lowest point 
(5/35 points) to other sensory modalities. This means that he could weakly create the auditory 
images, but he judged other images as “not an image at all.” To measure the vividness of  
visual imagery, KI took the VVIQ; lower scores on the VVIQ indicate weaker vividness of  
imagery. KI rated 16 questions using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1: no image at all, you only 
“know” that you are thinking of  the object to 5: perfectly clear and as lively as seeing it for real). He 
gave the lowest point (16/80 points), again indicating that he rated all visual images as “not an 
image at all.”
To measure the controllability of  visual images, we used the TVIC, on which higher scores 
indicate weaker controllability of  visual images. KI rated 12 questions on a three-category 
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scale (yes: I can change the visual images, no: I cannot change the visual images, and unsure). 
KI responded “unsure” for all questions, indicating that he could not judge his control of  the 
images because his visual images were quite weak.
To measure cognitive style, we used the VVQ, on which higher scores reflect stronger 
strategies of  verbalization or visualization. KI rated 30 questions including verbal and visual 
strategies using a two-category scale (yes or no). He scored 3 and 0 on each item for verbal and 
visual strategies, respectively.
Finally, to assess the vividness of  his auditory imagery, we adopted the AIQ, on which 
higher scores indicate weaker vividness of  imagery. KI rated 12 questions using a 5-point 
Likert scale (from 1: no image at all, you only “know” that you are thinking of  the object to 5: 
perfectly clear and as lively as seeing it for real). He scored 52/60 points, indicating that his 
auditory imagery might show a substantial deficit but not a complete deficit.
Discussion
The present study reported a single Japanese case of  aphantasia by focusing on the 
participant’s imagery abilities and using a questionnaire method. Considering his episodes and 
performance on the RCPM, his visual ability and reading/writing abilities might be intact. 
With regards to the vividness of  his imagery abilities, his auditory imagery might be weak 
but relatively intact, whereas his other sensory modalities, including visual imagery, show a 
complete deficit. Moreover, he could not judge the controllability of  images because of  his 
blind imagination, and we found that his cognitive style might mainly involve verbal, not 
visual, strategies.
KI realized his blind imagination in his twenties while he talked to his friends. This 
situation is similar to those of  previous reports (Zeman et al., 2015). Zeman et al. (2015) 
suggested that people typically became aware of  their blind imagination in their teens or 
twenties through conversation or reading. Moreover, KI was aware of  his compensatory 
strength in verbal processing (reading and writing). This compensatory strength in an 
individual with aphantasia is also similar to previous findings (Zeman et al., 2015), which 
indicated that individuals with aphantasia identified compensatory strength in the verbal, 
mathematical, and logical domains. Through a deficit of  visual imagery, people with 
aphantasia may show compensatory enhancement of  other abilities involving verbal 
processing. However, we should carefully interpret KI’s verbal ability because our present 
study did not examine it using a standardized examination.
A previous study (de Vito & Bartolomeo, 2016) indicated that people with aphantasia 
may have related psychopathological factors. KI also had been diagnosed with depression in 
his thirties. However, he had already realized blind imagination in his twenties, indicating 
that his blind imagination might be lifelong. Although some overlap may be assumed between 
aphantasia and congenital prosopagnosia, as indicated by Zeman et al. (2016), KI could 
differentiate between faces (such as those of  his wife and sons), and thus our case might not be 
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one of  congenital prosopagnosia; and while it might be congenital aphantasia (see also Zeman 
et al., 2015), it was not acquired (or psychopathological) aphantasia.
Regarding the imagery abilities of  our case, the vividness of  his visual, tactile, pain, 
gustatory, olfactory, and somatic images showed a complete deficit (QMI). Moreover, the 
VVIQ scores in our case were similar to those in previous studies (Jacobs et al., 2018; Keogh & 
Pearson, 2018; Zeman et al., 2015), suggesting that our case showed a complete deficit in visual 
imagery although his visual ability was intact (RCPM). Zeman et al. (2016) proposed the 
possibility that there are subtypes of  congenital aphantasia. One group showed substantial 
deficit and the other group showed complete deficit in visual imagery; our case may be 
assigned to the latter group. Moreover, we report the individual’s auditory imagery ability of  
aphantasia, while most previous studies have focused on the vividness of  visual imagery. We 
found that KI showed a substantial deficit in auditory imagery, indicating that his auditory 
imagery might be relatively intact compared to other sensory modalities. We assume that this 
ability may affect the compensatory strength in his verbal processing.
Furthermore, we reported not only vividness but also the controllability and cognitive 
style of  imagery abilities, which have not been reported by previous studies. We used TVIC 
to investigate controllability, but KI could not change the images because of  his blind 
imagination. Moreover, to assess cognitive style, we used the VVQ. We found that KI might 
have adopted a verbal style related to his strength in verbal processing. In addition to the 
vividness of  visual imagery, we should focus on other sensory modalities with a variety of  
imagery abilities to reveal the strengths and abilities of  individuals with aphantasia.
This study examined imagery ability using a questionnaire method, and recent studies 
(Dawes, Keogh, Andrillon, & Pearson, 2020; Zeman et al., 2020) reported important findings in 
relation to various perspectives, such as synesthesia, autobiographical and episodic memories, 
and object/spatial imagery. Although we also thought that the questionnaire method is 
sufficient to reveal imagery ability, we feel that we should also collect data using perceptual 
and cognitive tasks (including behavioral and physiological data), because one might argue 
that the questionnaire method is subjective (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008, 2010). Previous studies 
(Bainbridge et al., 2021; Jacobs et al., 2018; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Wicken et al., 2019) have 
already presented behavioral data using perceptual and cognitive tasks. We should collect 
many individuals with aphantasia for these experimental examinations. Although almost no 
physiological examinations of  individuals with aphantasia have been conducted (Dijkstra et 
al., 2019), these data are also needed to reveal the specific characteristics of  aphantasia.
One effective means of  support is to spread an understanding of  aphantasia to decrease 
difficulties in the lives of  individuals with aphantasia. However, in Japan, there have been 
almost no reports of  aphantasia. Our case study may be the first to examine a Japanese 
individual with aphantasia. Based on our preliminary case study, we expect that the study 
of  aphantasia could be developed in Japan and an understanding of  aphantasia spread in the 
Japanese society.
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